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Abstract
Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs people hold on either side of an
issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another
may believe it to be permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on
other properties of the ethical beliefs in question-in particular, how objective they are perceived to be. As a
psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits
more attention. We review recent psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the
extent to which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are perceived to be
more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance are somewhat systematic. This
evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of objectivity underpin quite different psychological
reactions to ethical disagreement. Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw
attention to unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the relevance of
moral objectivity to two issues of public policy.
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Abstract Ethical disputes arise over differences in the content of the ethical beliefs
people hold on either side of an issue. One person may believe that it is wrong to
have an abortion for financial reasons, whereas another may believe it to be
permissible. But, the magnitude and difficulty of such disputes may also depend on
other properties of the ethical beliefs in question-in particular, how objective they
are perceived to be. As a psychological property of moral belief, objectivity is
relatively unexplored, and we argue that it merits more attention. We review recent
psychological evidence which demonstrates that individuals differ in the extent to
which they perceive ethical beliefs to be objective, that some ethical beliefs are
perceived to be more objective than others, and that both these sources of variance
are somewhat systematic. This evidence also shows that differences in perceptions of
objectivity underpin quite different psychological reactions to ethical disagreement.
Apart from reviewing this evidence, our aim in this paper is to draw attention to
unanswered psychological questions about moral objectivity, and to discuss the
relevance of moral objectivity to two issues of public policy.
1 Introduction
A central question in the study of ethics is the extent to which a belief about some
ethical' matter represents a true, Objective fact about the world, as opposed to a
'For the purposes of this paper we use the terms "moral" and "ethical" interchangeably.
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merely subjective preference. As we will review below, this "meta-ethical" question
has occasioned considerable disagreement amongst philosophers. However our
review will not be oriented to advancing the consideration of the usual issues among
philosophers. Instead we propose to investigate whether there is agreement-or
disagreement-on these issues among ordinary members of a culture. Comparatively
little is known about this, the "psychology of meta-ethics". How do individuals
without philosophical training think of their ethical beliefs? Do they think of them as
facts or preferences? How do they react to ethical disagreement? What consequences
stem from holding a particular view of an ethical belief? In this paper, we review
work conducted by ourselves and other researchers which provides some answers to
these questions.
We first discuss some of the philosophical background to the study of ethical
objectivity, in order to discover which meta-ethical issues usefully could be explored
within the belief systems of philosophically na'fve individuals; but then we turn our
attention to discussing existing psychological findings about meta-ethics. Towards
the end of the paper, we discuss several implications this work has for issues of
public interest, including the credibility of criminal laws and voting behavior.

2 Philosophical Background
Philosophers have been inclined to take different positions regarding the question of
whether ethical beliefs are objective. Some philosophers have argued that there are
no true moral facts, or that morality is not objective. On this view, moral beliefs are
irreducibly subjective, akin to reports of subjective (or inter-subjective) experiences,
or to expressions of personal preference or taste (e.g. Ayer 1936; Blackburn 1984;
Greene 2002; Harman 1975; Mackie 1977; Williams 1985). Many other philOSOphers, however, have argued for a more objective position (e.g., Brink 1986; Kant
1959; Nagel 1970; Railton 1986; Smith 1994; Sturgeon 1985).
A complication in thinking about this issue is that questions about the objectivity
of ethical beliefs have been made in a variety of different ways by moral
philosophers. Philosophical debate in meta-ethics is organized by marking out a
set of closely related yet distinguishable polarities (see Sayre-McCord 1986; Snare
1992). Ethical "Objectivism", "realism", "cognitivism", and "universalism" are
related, yet different philosophical positions that lie at one end of a scale that tracks
the broad concept of objectivity, whereas "SUbjectivism", "anti-realism", "noncognitivism", and "relativism" are the respective opposites of these positions.
Precision about these terms is important, philosophically, although there is far from
complete concordance about their meaning.
To proceed, we will first define how we use these terms. According to our usage,
the distinction between universalism and relativism refers to a difference in the scope
of a particular ethical claim, i.e., who it applies to. If I say that it is wrong for you to
break a promise in a particular situation, then, if I am a universalist, I am also
committed to the view that it is wrong for anyone else in the same situation to break
the same promise. The set of features that need to be "the same" in this formulation
is hard to specify, but it clearly does not include aspects of personal identity, i.e., if it
is wrong for me to break the promise, it cannot be okay for you to break it, merely in
~
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virtue of you being a different personthan me. The distinction between universalism and
relativism is usually made at the level of culture, i.e., in terms of whether something that
is wrong in one culture is also wrong in another. But it can also be made at the interpersonal level, asabove, i.e., in terms of whether something that is wrong for one person
to do is also wrong for another person to do (see e.g., Sayre-McCord 1986; Williams
1972). Whichever way it is framed, this question is correctly interpreted as one about
what is actually right or wrong (permissible, impermissible, good, bad, etc.), and is not
simply a descriptive or sociological query about what the accepted views happen to be
in different regions or eras (see Snare 1992).
The distinction between relativist and universalist ethics has been explored to
some extent by psychologists (see Gabennesch 1990a for a review; and Forsyth
1980). However, other distinctions in meta-ethics are arguably more fundamental,
and have remained largely unexplored by empirical psychologists. One issue
concerns whether moral claims have a truth value. Cognitivism is the view that at
least some moral propositions are capable of having a truth value (Sayre-McCord
1986; Snare 1992), whereas non-cognitivism, or emotivism, is the view that moral
propositions are devoid of cognitive status-that is, they are not capable of having a
truth value, and serve simply to express attitudes or emotions (Ayer 1936; Stevenson
1937). Some modern non-cognitivists (e.g., Blackburn 1993, 1998; Gibbard 1990,
2003) do not deny that moral claims have a truth value, although they do deny that a
certain kind of truth applies to moral claims, i.e., truth that corresponds to the
objective facts in the world (see further, Sinnott-Armstrong 2006).
On the other hand, both objectivists and subjectivists agree that moral claims can
be literally true, but they diverge on what makes such claims true (Sayre-McCord
1986). Subjectivists believe that the truth of moral claims depends on the subjective
states of individuals (Sayre-McCord 1986), such that the claim: "theft is wrong", is
true only when its speaker has the appropriate attitude of disapproval towards theft.
This view can again be framed at the level of individuals-what
is ethically true for
an individual depends on the contents of their mental states; or at the level of a
culture (so-called, "inter-subjectivism")-what
is ethically true for a group depends
on some aggregation over the mental states of the group members. Objectivists, on
the other hand, hold that the truth conditions of moral claims are mind-independent
in the sense that a moral claim can be true without reference to the subjective states
of the individual making the judgment, and without reference to the conventions of
any group of people who are making the moral jUdgment (Sayre-McCord 1986)?
Hence, these two meta-ethical distinctions intersect as Fig. 1 illustrates.
Two points need clarification. First, meta-ethical subjectivism as defined by
Sayre-McCord (1986) and Snare (1992), is different from non-cognitivism in the
following sense-the non-cognitivist takes moral claims to be mere expressions of
attitudes, while the subjectivist takes them to be reports about subjective states or
attitudes (and hence they are capable of being true or false). Thus, although both
meta-ethical subjectivists and emotivists disagree with objectivists, the difference
between them is akin to the distinction between someone who in response to a sharp
jab says "that hurts" (a subjectivist, cognitivist position which is capable of having a

2

This way of describing objectivism is itself not uncontroversial, however (see Putnam 1987).
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Non-cognitivism: moral claims express
attitudes and do not have truth values

Cognitivism: moral claims have truth
values

SuQjectivism: moral
claims true in virtue
of suQjective mental
states

Objectivism: moral
claims true mindindependently

Fig. 1 Intersection of cognitivism, non-cognitivism and oQjectivism, subjectivism

truth value), as opposed to "ouch" (an emotivist, non-cognitivist position, which is
not capable of having a truth value).
Second, although similar to relativism, meta-ethical subjectivism is different in
the sensethat subjectivism makes a claim about the truth conditions of moral claims
(see Sayre-McCord 1986), whereas relativism makes a claim about the scope of
application of ethical principles-who
they are true for, rather than what makes
them true. So for instance, one could be an objective relativist, by saying that what is
ethically right for person A is different from what is right for person B, and that this
is true independent of any subjective attitudes that persons A and B might have
about the matter (see Snare 1992). In this case the scope of the claim about what is
ethically right is relative, because it does not apply to everyone, but its truth
conditions are purportedly objective.
Similarly one could be a sUbjectivist and a universalist, by claiming that although
the truth conditions of moral claims are subjective mental states, it so happens that
there is an underlying convergence of these subjective states (even if perhaps not
consciously realized), and so moral claims apply universally. This view would be
challenged by the fact of obvious ethical disagreements in practice, but one could
counter-argue that such disagreements ultimately rest on disagreements over factual,
non-ethical matters (for instance, about the meaning or consequences of a particular
act), rather than on fundamental matters of ethical principle; or alternatively that
disagreements arise over peripheral but not core ethical principles, and that the core
ethical principles are universally shared (though sUbjective).
This picture is necessarily a simplification of meta-ethical theory. Other metaethical distinctions exist, such as between realists and anti-realists, and philosophers
have often taken surprising meta-ethical positions. J. L. Mackie, for instance,
developed a form of cognitivist subjectivism, which held that ethical beliefs have
truth values, but that they are all false (Mackie 1977).3 It bears mention too that the
terminology used here is by no means universally agreed upon. Williams (1972) for
instance, regards non-cognitivism as a form of subjectivism, in contrast to both
Snare (1992) and Sayre-McCord (1986).
3

Whether this falsehood is supposed to be a contingent or necessary matter is not entirely clear in Mackie

(1977).
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This dense philosophical landscape may seem impenetrable for psychological
investigation. And indeed, it would be a somewhat pointless exercise to ask na"l've
participants to produce fine distinctions between sophisticated meta-ethical views.
However, we argue that people do have a set of underlying intuitions about the
objectivity or subjectivity of their ethical beliefs, and that these intuitions exist
without prior explicit theorizing. That is, in addition to having a wide range of basic,
or what philosophers refer to as "first order" moral beliefs, people also have "second
order" moral beliefs. We surmise that these second order beliefs have a set of
interesting and unique properties that cannot be captured simply by asking people
how strongly they agree with a particular ethical claim, i.e., by asking them about
their first order beliefs. But, if we want to understand the underlying psychology of
ethical Objectivity, we need ways to pose questions about the topic that are
understandable to human participants without any philosophical training-that is, we
need questions that are both philosophically and psychologically meaningful.
To that end, our empirical investigations have used two kinds of questions to
distinguish objective and subjective positions about ethical beliefs. First, we ask
questions that pertain to whether people take their ethical beliefs to be objectively
true statements of fact, or alternatively, subjective preferences or attitudes. Hence in
terms of Fig. 1, the contrast relevant for this paper is best approximated as that
between the far bottom right, objectivist position, and either of the remaining two
positions-either philosophical subjectivism or non-cognitivism. (This distinction
reflects the way Williams (1972) distinguishes between subjectivist and objectivist
positions.) Second, we ask participants whether in a situation of moral disagreement
between two (or more) parties, one party or other must be mistaken. An objectivist
must reply that at least one party is mistaken, whereas a subjectivist need not make
this claim (Snare 1992).

3 Psychological Literature
Psychologists have tended not to be interested in this sort of question. And indeed,
they have tended to focus very little on meta-ethical questions in general. We review
what little research there is on meta-ethical questions here before reporting on our
own investigations.
The psychological literature on moral judgment, at least during the twentieth
century, was heavily influenced by the developmental work of Piaget (1965) and
Kohlberg (1969, 1981). Both were strongly cognitivist in orientation, and sought to
understand the reasoning processesthat underlie moral judgment, which puts them at
odds with more modern affective approaches to moral judgment (see later).
Kohlberg proposed an ambitious stage theory of moral development. His dominant
research method was to present vignettes portraying various moral dilemmas, which
involved a conflict between acts that either complied with sociolegal rules, or else
violated these rules in order to serve human needs or welfare (Rosen 1980, p.69).
Children's moral development was assessed by the reasoning processes they
exhibited in reaching a conclusion, rather than by the specific conclusions they
reached (see Rosen 1980). Kohlberg's classificatory scheme comprised three overall
stages each with two sub-stages into which any individual's mode of moral
~ Springer
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reasoning could be placed (Kohl berg 1963, 1976). These three levels, in order of
increasing moral sophistication, were called the concrete individual perspective, the
member-of-society perspective, and the prior-to-society perspective (see Rosen
1980). This model was both controversial and influential (Rosen 1980; Darley and
Shultz 1990).
Kohlberg's model is concentrated on normative moral judgments, and offers few
resources for exploring questions about meta-ethics. Although he preferred an
"active organism" model of moral development, in which a person constructs and
then reconstructs their moral knowledge (Rosen 1980), there is little evidence that
Kohlberg (himself a moral realist and objectivist), regarded the pursuit of metaethical questions as a part of this active, constructive process.
The highest stage-stage 6 of Kohlberg's scheme-is described in terms of the
recruitment of universal ethical principles (Rosen 1980, p. 80). The moral agent at
this stage "is completely de-centered from society's expectations and bases his
resolutions to ethical conflicts upon universal principles of justice which are
prescriptively consistent without exception" (Rosen 1980, p.80). This characterization implies that the seeking of just solutions to moral problems, though not
necessarily straightforward, is ultimately a resolvable problem (cf. Nagel 1979).
Moral problems have objectively correct answers, and the moral agent of stage 6 can
discover what these answers are. This is a strong position, because not even all
objectivists agree that all moral dilemmas are indeed resolvable.4
More tellingly, Kohlberg's scheme characterizes the pursuit of meta-ethical
questions as a developmental aberration. Having erected his scheme, Kohlberg and
his collaborators observed a phenomenon which they had not previously paid much
attention to. Moral reasoners (typically boys) who had approached stage 4 in their
moral development appeared to be regressing to an earlier, egoistic stage of moral
development (see Rosen 1980, pp. 89-90). This stage, characterized by relativistic
and skeptical moral thought, was interpreted as a "rebellious moratorium", in
preparation for a restoration and deepening of the higher levels of moral thinking.
Initially this posed a challenge for Kohlberg's linear, deterministic theory, which did
not permit backwards movement through the stages. However, theoretical resolution
was achieved by classifying this phase as a transitional stage 4B, in which one "is on
the threshold of a breakthrough to principled moral reasoning which, although he
does not yet realize it, will supply him with the new standard for which he is
striving" (Rosen 1980, p.92).
This is the only place in Kohlberg's scheme that allows for moral doubt or
skepticism. Meta-ethical reflection plays no role in the higher levels (5 and 6) of his
scheme, and is instead confined to a stage of adolescent rebellion. But, the
possibilities are greater than this. Unlike Kohlberg's ethical skeptics (who tend also
to be egOists in his mind), not all ethical skeptics are egoists. A full characterization
of moral thinking needs to incorporate the possibility of a mature, and not amoral,
ethical skepticism.
Thomas Nagel, an ethical objectivist (see Nagel 1997) argues that there may be situations where various
moral values are incommensurate, and there is decisive support for two or more incompatible courses of
action (Nagel 1979). Although we may look for a "single scale on which all these apparently disparate
considerations can be measured, added, and balanced" (Nagel 1979, p.131), there may be no such scale.
4
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Meta-ethical questions have been investigated in the child development literature.
A range of studies have explored children's perceptions of social conventions, and in
particular, whether or not children are able to distinguish social and ethical
conventions (see review by Gabennesch 1990a). This research has shown that both
children and adults can distinguish ethical prescriptions from social conventions in
terms of seriousness (Shantz 1982), alterability (Tisak and Turiel 1988), and
dependence on cultural norms (Turiel 1978; Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003;
although both Nichols (2002, 2004) and Kelly et al. (2007) call the distinction
between ethical and conventional prescriptions into question. Participants in Turiel's
studies were asked questions such as whether a transgression would still be wrong if
there was no rule to prohibit it, or whether it would still be wrong in another culture
that has no prohibition on it. Such questions are undeniably meta-ethical, but they
concern the scope of application of an ethical principle, i.e., whether it is universal or
relative, not the nature of its truth conditions. While it is likely true in practice that
universalists are more likely to be objectivists than are relativists, there is no logical
requirement that this be the case.
Consider the question whether it would still be wrong to commit a transgression
even if there were no rule to prohibit it. Answering "yes" to this question does not
automatically make one an objectivist. A "yes" response implies that the warrant for
the principle lies deeper than the mere fact that a rule has been enacted-the
principle is taken to be more than a mere convention, as Turiel and others have
argued (although this interpretation is controversial, see Gabennesch 1990a, b;
Shweder 1990; Helwig et al. 1990). But, this deeper warrant could be either
sUbjective or Objective-it could arise from the subjective mental states of members
of a community (subjective), or it could arise from an external source, such as God
(objective), or from some other objective source. Indicating that the existence of a
rule is not sufficient to ground moral commitments does not commit a person to
being either a subjectivist or an objectivist.
Similarly, consider the question whether it would be wrong for another culture to
allow something that in our culture is prohibited, i.e., whether a particular moral
claim is wrong "for some people" or "for real" (Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003). A
complication exists with this question in that "for some people" and "for real" are
not true opposites-the question is thus somewhat ambiguous as to whether it is
asking about universalism or objectivism. On one reading of this question, "for real"
is equivalent to "for all people", and thus answering "for real" indicates a
universalist position, but not necessarily an objectivist one-a subjectivist might
want to apply a moral claim universally, without being committed to its having an
objective foundation. On another reading of this question, the question is purely
descriptive, and asks about the presence of conflicting attitudes within society. One
final interpretation is that the question does ask about Objectivity-the phrase "for
some people" denotes a kind of "non-realness" precisely because it is contrasted
with "for real". On this reading, the question is similar to the ones we have asked our
participants. But, without further specification the question is ambiguous.
This is not intended as a decisive criticism of the approach adopted by Nichols
and Folds-Bennett (2003). They were interested in the moral responses of 4-6 year
old children, and the question they asked, despite its complications, seems simpler
and thus more appropriate for children in that age group, who are not likely to be
~
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troubled by the above considerations. Their chief finding was that children treat
moral transgressions as universally wrong, but do not treat conventional transgressions in this way.
Attempts to investigate adult meta-ethical views have also tended to focus on
perceptions of the universality of ethical claims. In a series of studies, Donelson
Forsyth and his collaborators (Forsyth 1980, 1981; Forsyth and Berger 1982;
Forsyth and Pope 1984) explored what he terms "ethical ideologies", which are
based on the intersection of two variables, relativism and idealism, as measured by
his Ethics Position Questionnaire (Forsyth 1980). Forsyth's resulting taxonomy was
found to predict the severity of moral judgments (Forsyth 1981; Forsyth and Berger
1982), and although it was found not to predict moral behavior in a setting where the
temptation to cheat was presented, it did predict differences in participants' reactions
to their own moral transgreSSions(Forsyth and Berger 1982).
Forsyth's questions regarding relativism included items such as the following:
14.
15.
16.

Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to 'rightness'.
Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved since what is
moral or immoral is up to the individual.
Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate how a person should
behave, and are not to be applied in making jUdgments of others.

Such items perhaps do capture meta-ethical beliefs, but they go no further than
the child development literature in this regard. The principal distinction is again
between relativism and universalism. And although questions of the universality of
ethical claims are undoubtedly within the scope of meta-ethics, they do not directly
map onto questions about the objectivity of ethical claims.
The second dimension of Forsyth's (1980, 1981) taxonomy is puzzling. In his
Ethics Position Questionnaire (Forsyth 1980), ten statements (which participants rate
their level of agreement with), are used to assessthe construct of "idealism". Two
such examples are:
1. A person should make certain that their actions never intentionally harm
another even to a small degree.
5. One should not perform an action which might in any way threaten the dignity
and welfare of another individual.
Eight further statements assess ethical idealism in a similar way. The odd
characteristic of these statements is that they seem to assessbeliefs about the way the
world works rather than any sort of ethical ideology. Many small acts of intentional
harm occur daily, often without any ethical component: a dentist inflicts intentional
harm on a patient when probing sensitive teeth (see e.g., Bucciarelli et al. 2008). The
possibility of avoiding all of these minor harms is quite remote. It would thus seem
more accurate to think of this "idealism" scale as characterized by naivety at one end
and world wisdom at the other. And it is unclear how this dimension assessesan
important component of ethical thought.
The bottom line from the preceding considerations is that questions about
universalism, although likely to produce answers that correlate highly with questions
about Objectivity, are not identical to those questions. Our own research has
concentrated on questions about objectivity: to what extent do people regard their
~
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moral beliefs as objective statements of fact, as opposed to mere subjective
preferences? To that end, in a recent paper (Goodwin and Darley 2008), we asked
participants two different sorts of question in order to get at the perceived objectivity
of their ethical (and other sorts of) beliefs: whether they thought that there could be a
correct answer as to whether a particular ethical belief was true (or alternatively, in
Experiment 1, whether they thought that a particular belief that they held was true, as
opposed to being an opinion or attitude); and whether they thought that a person
who disagreed with them about the belief was mistaken, or whether instead neither
party need be mistaken in the face of disagreement. Our strategy was to average
responses to these questions together to create a composite index of ethical
objectivity (for further details, see Goodwin and Darley 2008).
These three questions track some of the central philosophical thinking on the
topiC of ethical objectivity. Philosophers have been concerned with whether ethical
statements possess truth values, and with whether correct answers exist to ethical
questions.s And one common philosophical criterion for whether a belief is objective
or not is whether disagreement over it implies that one of the disagreeing parties is
mistaken (see e.g., Smith 1994; Snare 1992). Moreover, both pilot testing and
intuition suggested that the questions we asked are readily understandable, and that
experimental participants are able to produce answers to them.
Before embarking on this research, it was an open question how people would
perceive the objectivity of their ethical beliefs. Psychological research on "narve
realism" has shown that people typically treat their own perceptions and preferences
as fundamentally "correct" (Ross and Ward 1995). Extending this perspective to the
ethical domain, it follows that most people should be highly objective about their
ethical beliefs (and in fact, any sort of belief). However, other considerations suggest
the opposite prediction: that people will self-consciously appreciate the socially
constructed nature of ethical beliefs, and thus be moral subjectivists. Chief among
these considerations is the observation made by several social commentators that we
live in a more morally contested and pOSSiblyrelativistic society than we once did
(e.g., Hunter 1991). These broad social trends may thus be reflected in the
perception that moral issues are ultimately subjective matters.
Our initial research yielded the following three central findings (Goodwin and
Darley 2008), which are contrary to both of these perspectives. We concentrated
primarily on canonical examples of moral transgressions that involved violations of
justice or the infliction of harm (see Haidt 2007). The results of several experiments
indicated that people take beliefs about the wrongness of such transgressions to be
quite objective-almost
as objective as beliefs about matters of everyday or
scientific fact, and more objective than beliefs about social conventions (i.e.,
appropriate dress wear and manners) and beliefs about matters of taste. That is, they
tend to indicate that such ethical beliefs are true, that there is a correct answer as to
their truth, and that in the face of disagreement, one or other party is mistaken. This

A note about our use of the term "belief": although it is the standard philosophical position, we do not
intend the term "belief" to imply that a person assentsto the truth of the proposition they believe (see e.g.,
Lacey 1996)-that would presuppose an answer to the question we want to investigate. Rather, we intend
a weaker, more psychological reading of the term belief, which denotes an attitude of agreement or assent,
without a further commitment to truth (see e.g., Reber 1996).
5
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finding was robust when controlling for how strongly individuals agreed with beliefs
from each of these classes.
However, individuals differed considerably in the degree of objectivity they
ascribed to such beliefs. The majority of individuals were quite objective, but there
were some individuals who were not. One pertinent predictor of ethical objectivity
was whether a person thought that ethical beliefs are ultimately grounded by a
religious deity-those individuals who thought this was the case tended to be more
objective than those who did not. Moral objectivity was particularly strong among
individuals who did not think that right and wrong acts are possible without the
existence of a divine being.
There was also some indication from these initial experiments that the specific
content of ethical beliefs makes a difference in terms of how objective such beliefs
are perceived to be. For instance, people tended to treat a statement about the
wrongness of consciously discriminating against another person on the basis of race
as more objective than a statement about the goodness of anonymously donating
10% of one's income to charity. This finding contrasts with a presupposition that
runs strongly through some philosophical writing-that ethical beliefs as a whole are
objective or subjective, and that one's meta-ethical view should apply en masse to
one's entire set of ethical beliefs, in a top-down, deductive fashion-what SinnottArmstrong (2009) refers to as the uniformity assumption.6 Clearly, our participants
did not accord with this description.
This initial research thus partially supported a na'fve realist account of ethical
beliefs-people generally found ethical beliefs about canonical moral transgressions
to be highly objective. But there are two features of our data which cannot be
accounted for by a simple narve realist account. First, not everyone treats their
ethical beliefs as Objective-some participants were highly subjective even about
canonical moral transgressions. Second, not all ethical beliefs are treated equally, and
there appears to be considerable variation in perceived Objectivity, depending on the
kind of ethical belief in question.
One caveat from this first investigation is that we only surveyed samples of
undergraduate and graduate student participants from a single American university.
Certainly this is a limitation. But, given the nature of our findings we do not consider
it to be a critical one, becausewe suspect that in a broader sample, at least two of our
main results would be amplified. A broader sample of Western participants is likely
to include many who have been much less exposed to skeptical arguments about the
nature of morality and religious belief than the students in our samples. We would
thus expect that perceptions of moral objectivity would be stronger than in our
sample, and that the religious grounding of ethics would also be a stronger predictor
of ethical objectivity. It would, of course, be of interest to investigate this, and also to
investigate whether perceptions of objectivity are stronger in Western cultures than
in others (see Mackie 1977, for discussion of how notions of objectivity permeate
Western moral discourse).
In more recent research we have followed up three questions left unanswered by
our initial investigations: (1) Why are some ethical beliefs treated as more objective
Although see Gill (2008, 2009) for philosophical critique of this uniformity assumption, and for a
defense of meta-ethical variability.
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than others? (2) Why are some people more objective about their ethical beliefs than
others? (3) Does holding an objectivist or subjectivist position about an ethical belief
have any important psychological or behavioral consequences?

4 Why Are Some Ethical Beliefs Treated More Objectively Than Others?
The initial evidence in our 2008 paper showed that people do not treat all ethical
beliefs as being equally objective. Why is this? What might predict whether a moral
belief is treated as highly objective, or not? In unpublished work, we have
investigated three specific hypotheses (Goodwin and Darley 2009).
The first hypothesis is that people will be more objective about transgressions that
involve the infliction of direct personal harm or injustice. Jon Haidt and his COlleagues
(e.g., Haidt and Graham 2007; Graham et al. 2009) have argued that such
transgressions are the only ones consistently regarded as immoral in Western societies.
Other actions that do not cause physical harm or injustice, but that provoke disgust or
contempt, are regarded as moral violations only by more conservative (Haidt and
Graham 2007; Graham et al. 2009) and lower class Westerners (Haidt et al. 1993).
Other research has indicated that only harm and justice based transgressions are
considered to be moral violations in all cultures (Shweder 2003; Shweder et al. 1997;
although some cultures judge as immoral at least some actions that generate emotions
of contempt or disgust). Taking a less empirical, more philosophical perspective,
Royzman et al. (2009), summarize the arguments that harm is the fundamental basis of
moral jUdgments. Each of these perspectives suggests that people will be highly
objective only about harm or justice-driven transgressions.7
The second hypothesis is that people will regard the negativity of moral
transgressions (i.e., their wrongness or badness) as more objective than the positivity
of morally exemplary acts (i.e., their rightness or goodness). One motivation for this
hypothesis stems from the fact that legal codes are primarily concerned with
prohibiting rather than recommending action. This may, in part, reflect an important
underlying moral principle, i.e., that clear and objective moral principles can be
formulated about what is bad or wrong to do, but not about what is good or right.
The third hypothesis is that people will be more likely to view a moral belief as
objective to the extent that they think other people hold that belief-that is, they are
influenced by the degree of consensus they perceive to hold about the belief.
To investigate these hypotheses, we developed an experiment in which participants
were asked to rate the objectivity of 12 different moral beliefs, as well as some factual
beliefs and some beliefs about social conventions. The moral beliefs fell into four
different classes.One class consisted of beliefs about the wrongness of causing harm or
injustice-assault, cheating, and the provision of a false alibi. The second class
consisted of beliefs about the wrongness of symbolic harms-desecrating a 9/11
memorial, performing a Nazi salute to a Jewish sporting audience, and flag burning. The
third class consisted of beliefs about the goodness of morally exemplary acts-donating
money to charity, performing.a risky swim rescue, and performing onerous energy
7 Note, however, that other arguments exist which call into question whether harm is the fundamental
basis of morality (seee.g., Kelly et al. 2007).
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conservation activities. And the fourth class consisted of beliefs about the permissibility
of highly contested value of life issues-abortion, and two different instances of
euthanasia. The contrast between the first (harm, injustice) and second (symbolic harm)
classes allows an assessment of whether direct harm or injustice predicts greater
Objectivity. The contrast between the first two classes (transgressions) and the third class
(morally exemplary acts) allows an assessment of whether people ascribe greater
Objectivity to moral transgreSSions than they do to morally exemplary acts. And the
contrast between the first three classes and the fourth class (contested value of life issues)
allows an assessmentof whether people are more Objective about beliefs that they suspect
are widely shared. To investigate this question more precisely, we also asked participants
to estimate the percentage of US citizens they thought would agree with each belief.
The three items with in each category hung together well, both in terms of the patterns
of means and inter-correlations (see Goodwin and Darley 2009). And, importantly, all
of the ensuing analyses controlled for how strongly participants agreed with each
belief. As in our previous studies, participants were highly objective about the
wrongness of inflicting harm and injustice. However, they were no more objective
about such transgreSSions than they were about transgreSSions which inflicted much
more symbolic wrongs. This result was surprising. It does not rule out direct, physical
harm or injustice as important predictors of perceived Objectivity, but it does show that
their presence is not necessary for an ethical belief to be treated as highly objective. It is
of course possible that our participants thought that the symbolic wrongs would inflict
emotional harm of equivalent magnitude to the harms caused by the directly harmful or
unjust actions. This would be useful to investigate. However, even if this did turn out to
be true, it would not undercut our main conclusion: our results would still show that the
nature of the harm or injustice that a moral transgreSSion causes need not be direct or
phYSical, in order for the wrongness of that act to be perceived as highly Objective.
Participants were also more objective about the wrongness of both kinds of
transgreSSion (direct harms or injustices, as well as symbolic harms) than they were
about the goodness of the morally exemplary actions. This difference was highly
significant for each of the items we investigated (there was no overlap between any of
the means from the two different categories: good vs. wrong). This suggests that
wrongness is indeed perceived to be a more objective moral property than goodness,
even when controlling for how strongly participants agreed with the beliefs in the two
categories. This finding, however, might have occurred for two different reasons. On the
one hand, it could be that, as we suggest, the valence of the behavior (whether it is
positive or negative) is what accounts for the difference in perceived Objectivity. But, it
might also be that the crucial difference is one between statements of value (goodness,
badness) and statements of norms (rightness, wrongness). Our finding could be
explained by the idea that people take claims about rightness and wrongness to be more
objective than claims about goodness and badness, which is why they treated morally
wrong as a more objective category than morally gOOd. This seems implausible for
positively valenced items, i.e., it seems unlikely to us that people would treat rightness
as a more objective category than goodness, at least when it is predicated of the same
action. The claim that some action is morally right makes it more Obligatory than the
claim that it is merely morally good (see e.g., Gert 2005, p. 321-322), and we thus
suspect that a claim about rightness is less likely to be perceived as Objective than a
claim about goodness. But, we cannot as confidently rule out this explanation in the
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negative domain-perhaps people do indeed treat wrongness as more objective than
badness.s We are thus currently conducting an investigation to determine whether
valence or moral language is the chief driver of the effects described in the present
study.9
Finally, our participants treated the goodness of morally exemplary actions as
more objective than the permissibility (or impermissibility, depending on how they
responded) of highly contested value of life choices. In fact, they were no more
objective about the wrongness of social conventions than they were about the
permissibility (or impermissibility) of the value of life choices. Further analyses,
which used participants' estimated consensus responses for each moral belief,
showed that such estimates were very reliable predictors of perceived objectivity
(our results demonstrated an across-items correlation between objectivity and
perceived consensus of r= .84), over and above how strongly participants agreed
with each of the beliefs in question. Because they are correlational, these data are of
course consistent with an alternative interpretation according to which perceived
objectivity inflates consensus estimates, i.e., it is objectivity that drives consensus
judgments rather than the reverse. Our current data is not sufficient to rule out this
hypothesis, and indeed it may well be true. Perhaps both directions of causation
operate. At any rate, in order to draw a causal inference from consensus assessments
to Objectivity, a study which manipulates perceived consensus estimates is called for.
These results suggest three reasons why some ethical beliefs are treated as more
objective than others. First, although harm and injustice are likely to be important
predictors, their occurrence is not necessary in order for a moral belief to be
perceived as highly objective. Second, people seem to treat beliefs about the
wrongness of moral transgreSSionsas more objective than beliefs about the goodness
of morally exemplary actions. And third, perceived consensus appears to predict
objectivity assessments. These conclusions are preliminary at this point; all three
results invite follow-up investigations, which we are currently carrying out.

5 Systematic Individual

Differences in Ethical Oqjectivity

The previous study established that there is systematic variation in Objectivity
assessmentsacross different kinds of ethical belief. In our previous studies, we had
also shown that there were some systematic individual differences in Objectivity.
We thank Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for this point. Gert (2005, p. 322) makes the point, which we agree
with, that the terms "morally good" and "morally right" tend to refer to different kinds of action, whereas
"morally bad" and "morally wrong" are used more interchangeably. We interpret this point as counting in
favor of our valence hypothesis regarding negative moral actions-it suggeststo us that there will not be a
substantial difference injudgments of oQjectivity regarding the categories morally bad and morally wrong.
Gert himself, however, takes wrongness to be a more objective property than badness (see p. 325). For
positive moral actions, Gert's point about the non- interchangeability between the terms "good" and
"right" suggests that in order to clearly test whether goodness is considered less oQjective than rightness,
these moral properties may need to be predicated of different actions.
9 A further possible explanation of our finding, suggested by an anonymous reviewer, is that people may
think that it is more likely that people would do morally good (or right) things for the wrong reasons, than
that they would do morally bad (or wrong) things for the right reasons. This is an intriguing possibility,
and worth investigating.
8
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Those who grounded their ethical beliefs in religious ideology were more objective
than those who did not. This finding is correlational, and it would be desirable to
show that there is a causal influence at work here. This might be done
experimentally by manipulating the salience of religious ideas, and showing a boost
in objectivity scores (among religious participants) when religious ideas are made
salient. While this finding would be important, other individual differences may also
predict jUdgments of objectivity, and these have been the focus of our most recent
investigations. In particular, we have been interested in whether certain cognitive
and personality variables predict jUdgments of moral objectivity.
One striking observation from our previous work concerned the kinds of
explanations participants gave for why disagreement may have arisen about an
ethical issue. In those studies (Goodwin and Darley 2008), we asked participants to
explain why disagreement may have arisen in each case.The differences in the kinds of
explanations people offered were striking. Some participants, typically the objectivist
responders, seemed to be less inclined to explain why the disagreement may have
arisen. Rather, they tended to make blanket responseswhich either reiterated their own
belief, which expressed disbelief that another person could have disagreed with them,
or which ascribed some moral defect to the disagreeing other person. For instance, in
response to a disagreement over whether robbery to pay for a vacation is wrong, they
would say things about the person who disagreed with them like:
The other person obviously has no values, and no respect for the property of
others!
or:
The other person has a warped view of what is a moral action.
By contrast, those who responded more subjectively seemed more interested in
explaining the disagreement. They would say things like:
Values are probably the source of disagreement. A hedonist would feel morally
obliged to steal for the vacation. A compassionate person would not.
or:
The source of disagreement is most likely how the other person and I derive
our morals. It could be that he is a radical hedonist while I take a more
uti Iitarian approach.
The subjectivists' responses seemed to place more emphasis on explaining the
source of the disagreement in terms of competing moral values, whereas the
objectivist responses tended to explain the disagreement in terms of the sheer
presence or absence of moral values at all. And indeed, as rated by an independent
coder, there were reliable differences in the quality and kind of explanations that
subjectivists and objectivists gave (Goodwin 2009).
These results suggest that part of what may underlie objectivist responding to an
ethical disagreement is a tendency not to think of some of the alternative reasons for
doubting or disagreeing with the belief in question. If a person actively considers
some of the reasons for doubting an ethical belief they hold, they may be inclined to
be less objective about that particular belief. To investigate this idea, we presented
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participants with a task that measuresdi~unctive reasoning ability, i.e., the tendency
to actively unpack alternative possibilities when reasoning (Goodwin 2009). We
used the following "five blocks" task originally devised by Levesque (1986, 1989)
and investigated further by Toplak and Stanovich (2002) and Over et al. (in press):
There are five blocks in a stack, where the second one from the top is green
and the fourth is not green. Is a green block definitely on top of a non-green
block?
Participants have to choose between three response options: yes, no, cannot tell. The
most intuitively plausible response is to say "cannot tell", but this is incorrect. To
infer the correct solution you need to consider the alternative possibilities for the
indeterminate third block-you need to unpack the two distinct alternatives for this
block and examine their consequences.The correct answer is "yes": if the third block
is green, then since it is directly on top of the fourth non-green block, the condition
is fulfilled; alternatively, if the third block is not green, then since it is directly
underneath the second green block, the condition is also fulfilled. Thus, whichever
color the third block happens to be, there is definitely a green block directly on top
of a non-green block.
Toplak and Stanovich (2002) examined this task along with a range of other tasks
which are aimed at assessing "disjunctive thinking". These tasks correlate only
moderately with indicators of cognitive ability such as SAT scores, which led Toplak
and Stanovich to describe them as measures of a dispositional tendency towards
di~unctive thinking rather than as cognitive ability measures. In our initial
experiment (Goodwin 2009), we used only the five block task because it has no
moral content, and because it seemed to capture the difference in the kind of
thinking that underpinned ethically objectivist and subjectivist responses in our free
response task. Our hypothesis was that participants who performed the five blocks
task correctly would tend to be less objective about their ethical beliefs than
participants who did not. Such individuals should possessa dispositional tendency to
think disjunctively, and thus, in a moral context, they should be more inclined to
actively consider the reasons why another person might disagree with their ethical
beliefs. However, they should not be more objective about matters of taste, where
disagreement can exist at the level of brute preferences rather than reasons.
We also presented participants with a range of other measures that we suspected
might predict objectivity: Frederick's (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test, which is a
simple, three measure instrument which measures a person's tendency to over-ride
an immediate, intuitive response, and which correlates highly with general
intelligence; Cacioppo et al.'s (1984) Need for Cognition scale, which measures a
person's "tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors"; and
Kruglanski et al.'s (1993; Webster and Kruglanski 1994) Need for Closure scale,
which measures a person's "need for an answer on some topic, any answer as
opposed to confusion and ambiguity".
The study demonstrated that only the di~unctive thinking measure reliably
predicted ethical objectivity. Those participants who performed this task correctly
were significantly less objective on ethical items than those who performed it
incorrectly (we observed a correlation between performance on this problem and
ethical objectivity of r= .36). But they were no more objective than the incorrect
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responders on the items about matters of taste. In contrast, and somewhat to our
surprise, none of the other measuresreliably predicted ethical objectivity. This initial
result lends credence to the idea that a propensity towards disjunctive thinking
inclines people towards a more sUbjective view of their ethical beliefs.
A follow-up study presented participants with a wider array of di~unctive
reasoning tasks that were drawn from Toplak and Stanovich (2002). One of these
tasks was isomorphic to the three blocks task presented earlier and the other was
closely related to it. The average performance on these items correlated negatively
with objectivity assessments,replicating the previous finding. We again measured
Need for Cognition, Need for Closure, and Cognitive Reflection, and these measures
were not correlated with Objectivity. The experiment excluded one extra "mindset"
variable. When answering the objectivity questions, half of the participants were
instructed to adopt an "experiential" mindset-they were instructed to respond with
their "first, natural response" and that the experiment was only interested in
investigating people's "gut level reactions" (see Epstein 1991, 1994). In contrast, the
remaining participants were instructed to be "as rational and analytic as possible"
(Epstein 1991, 1994). This manipulation did not produce a difference in the overall
level of objectivity scores, but it did produce a marked difference in the pattern of
observed correlations. The correlation between the di~unctive thinking measure and
objectivity was much stronger in the "experiential" condition (r= .59), and was not
reliable at all in the "rational" condition (r= .05). We surmise that the experiential
instructions reflect the normal way in which participants respond to these sorts of
question, which is why this condition replicated the strong correlation observed in
our first experiment. However, this result was not predicted, and the exact reason for
the difference between the two conditions is not clear. One possibility is that the
instruction to think rationally pushed participants who would not normally consider
the alternative reasons for disagreeing with an ethical belief, to do so. However, the
overall mean Objectivity score in the rational condition was not lower than it was in
the experiential condition, which does not support this explanation.
Regardless, these correlational results suggest that there is an underlying
cognitive variable-perhaps the tendency to reason disjunctively-which
underpins
the way people make assessments of ethical objectivity. Our current working
hypothesis is that individuals who are inclined to think di~unctively on a problemsolving task, are also more inclined to generate alternative reasons why another
person might doubt or disagree with an ethical belief that they themselves hold.
Sometimes these alternative reasons may have persuasive appeal-thus, on average,
this kind of thinking is likely to lower assessmentsof ethical Objectivity. Thus, in our
current research, we are experimentally inducing participants to first think of
alternative reasons for doubting or disagreeing with an ethical belief before asking
them to respond to questions about the objectivity of that belief-predicting a drop
in perceived objectivity under these conditions, compared with a control condition.

6 Consequences of Taking an Oqjective Position
One of our underlying motivations for studying the psychology of meta-ethics was
to examine the sorts of consequences that stem from holding a particular meta~
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ethical view. Do objectivists and subjectivists differ in how they respond to ethical
disagreement? Philosophers have often written as though, in the face of ethical
disagreement, objectivists ought to be more open to listening to the arguments of the
disagreeing other party (e.g., Snare 1992). If you are an objectivist, you believe that
there is a true fact of the matter to be discovered about any ethical belief. As a
consequence, when disagreement arises, you should be interested to hear whether the
disagreeing other party has any convincing reasons that might change your mind.
Even if you are highly confident about the belief in question, you should still be
interested to hear an opposing view, in case you have overlooked some pertinent
piece of information. But, if you are a subjectivist, you believe that there is no fact of
the matter to be discovered, and that the disagreement is essentially a clash of brute
preferences. So you should be less motivated to listen to the arguments of the other
party.
As a psychological hypothesis, however, this prediction seems implausible,
particularly when examining the open-ended responses that objectivists and
subjectivists gave when explaining why disagreement may have arisen (see earlier;
objectivist: "the other person has no values", subjectivist: "values are probably the
source of disagreement"). Nevertheless, this way of framing the issue does pose an
interesting psychological question: when confronted with ethical disagreement, do
ethical objectivists respond in a more "open" or a more "closed" fashion than
subjectivists? To examine this question, one of our earlier studies asked participants
three different questions to investigate their responses to ethical disagreement. One
question asked them to indicate how comfortable they would be to have the person
who disagreed with them as a room-mate (a standard social psychological measure
of social distance), a second question asked about the personality attributions they
would make about the disagreeing other person (personality attributions), and a third
question asked whether they thought it would be possible for them to give up their
agreement with their original belief (self-reported rigidity of view). Each of these
three questions was asked for each of the ethical disagreements that participants were
presented with.
Across all three variables, objectivist responders responded in a more "closed"
way in the face of ethical disagreement (Goodwin and Darley 2009). They were less
comfortable than subjectivist responders with a person who disagreed with them
about an ethical issue, even when controlling for how strongly they agreed with the
ethical claim in question. They were also more likely to say that the disagreeing
other person was "not a moral person". And they were less likely to indicate that it
was possible that they could give up their agreement with the belief in question. A
follow-up study replicated these effects using slightly different measures. And in
each case, ethical Objectivity predicted more closed responses in the face of
disagreement, controlling for how strongly participants agreed with the beliefs in
question (Goodwin and Darley 2009).
These results indicate that there appear to be important judgmental and possibly
behavioral consequences that stem from holding a particular meta-ethical view.
Moreover, lay meta-ethical views seem to have predictive effects over and above
how strongly people agree with a particular belief. Although strength of agreement
and objectivity are correlated-as people agree with an ethical belief more strongly,
they tend to be regard it as being more objective-they are not perfectly correlated,
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and they have independent predictive effects. Follow up work in this domain should
aim to test how meta-ethical views affect real interactions in which an ethical
disagreement occurs.

7 Oqjectivity

and Current Theories of Moral Cognition

What is the relationship between studies of moral objectivity and current theorizing
in moral cognition? A good deal of current theorizing is concerned with the extent to
which emotions relate to moral judgments. One kind of theory concentrates on the
emotions that moral violations produce. For instance, Rozin and his collaborators
have proposed a theory which argues that characteristic emotions are produced by
different sorts of moral violation (Rozin et al. 1999). According to this theory, anger
typically arises from violations of personal autonomy (i.e., infractions involving
harm, injustice, violations of rights or restrictions in freedom), contempt arises from
violations of a community ethic (i.e., violations of social duties and obligations,
disrespect for social standing and authority, and disloyalty), and disgust arises from
violations of a divinity ethic (i.e., violations of the natural order, of the body, and of
purity and sanctity). These authors' experiments demonstrated support for these
linkages-when presented with violations of the three different sorts, people tended
to select and generate the emotions that 'fit', according to the theory.
Other theories have concentrated on the way in which emotions themselves
produce moral jUdgments. Jon Haidt and his collaborators have performed an
intriguing series of studies which demonstrate that incidental emotions can exert
large effects on moral judgment. In one study, participants were hypnotized to feel a
pang of disgust whenever they read a non-moral word such as "often" (Wheatley and
Haidt 2006). They later read a moral Vignette which described a moral transgression.
All participants were hypnotized, but the crucial variable was whether the targeted
word occurred in the story, or not. When it did, participants made harsher moral
evaluations of the transgression. The incidental occurrence of moral emotions thus
appears to affect moral judgment. Similarly, in more recent studies, Haidt and his
collaborators have shown in different ways how the incidental experience of disgust
affects moral judgments. For instance, Schnall et al. (2008) have shown how disgust
that is elicited by the surrounding environment, or by remembered experiences,
produces an increase in the severity of moral judgments about unrelated matters.
Other evidence demonstrates the causal role of emotions in different ways. For
instance, Haidt has documented the phenomenon of 'moral dumbfounding', whereby
people have strong moral reactions to certain transgressions such as incest, but are
not able to explain their reaction in any satisfactory way-' itjust feels wrong' being
a typical response (e.g., Haidt 2001). The interpretation of this finding was that the
moral judgment is primarily caused by an emotional reaction, rather than a reason.
Similarly, Haidt has documented that for these kinds of violations, an individuals'
emotional reaction to the scenario is a more powerful predictor of their eventual
moral judgments than is their assessmentof the harm that the action produces (Haidt
et al. 1993).
There is also some evidence that self-directed moral emotions are an important
cause of moral decisions. Monin and Miller (2001) have documented a phenomenon
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which they refer to as 'moral licensing'. In their studies, when participants were able
to affirm their non-prejudiced moral identities in an initial phase of the experiment,
they were subsequently more likely to express politically incorrect opinions, and to
make hypothetical choices which accorded with those opinions. The explanation for
these effects was that a person's moral behavior is driven in the moment by selfperception of their own moral identity, which arguably has an important emotional
component. In a more recent study, Sachdeva et al. (2009) corroborated this finding,
and also demonstrated evidence of the inverse effect. Participants who had written
about a past instance of their own moral behavior were subsequently less likely to
donate money to charity than those had not. But, participants who had written about
a past instance of their own immoral behavior were subsequently more likely to
donate money to charity. Both effects suggest that self-directed moral emotions can
exert a causal influence on moral behavior.
Finally, more recent research has relied on fMRI scanning to document the nature
of the emotional responses that may underlie moral judgment (e.g., Greene et al.
2001, 2004; Moll et al. 2003; Sanfey et al. 2003). The upshot of this research has
been to show that brain areas that are associated with emotional responding are
activated in response to a variety of moral situations. For instance, Greene et al.
(2001) showed that moral dilemmas that are thought to activate moral emotions, do
in fact activate areas of the brain associated with emotional processing (the medial
frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, angular gyrus) in contrast with a set of
control problems which activated areas associated with working memory (middle
frontal gyrus, parietal lobes). Sanfey et al. (2003) showed that the anterior insula
region of the brain-an area which is also known to be associated with emotional
processing-is more strongly activated in response to unfair offers in the context of
the Ultimatum Game,lO than in response to fair offers. More recent work has
illustrated that cognitive processes interact with emotional processes in moral
judgment. Greater recruitment of brain regions known to subserve abstract reasoning
and cognitive control (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior
cingulated cortex) predicted longer response times on difficult personal dilemmas,
and also more utilitarian responses on such dilemmas (Greene et al. 2004).
There is thus an accumulated body of evidence that illustrates that emotions are
strongly associated with moral judgments and actions. But there is disagreement
about the nature of this relationship. Prinz (2006) has usefully categorized the
possible relationships that could be argued for. The least controversial position,
which it is now almost impossible to disagree with, is that emotions co-occur with
moral judgments, at least some of the time. Both fMRI and self-report data
unequivocally support this contention. It is more difficult to know how often
emotions co-occur with moral judgments, and there is little existing data which is
relevant to this broader issue.
The most radical position, which Prinz adopts, is that emotions are constitutive of
moral jUdgment-ali moral judgments are underpinned by an affective response of
some kind, even if this affective response is not activated at the time of jUdgment.

In this game, participants are first divided into pairs. One participant is given a small sum of money (say
$10), and makes an offer to the other participant which that person has the choice either to accept or reject.
10
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There are some considerable attractions to this position as a philosophical theory,
although its empirical support is indirect (see Joyce 2009; Prinz 2007).
A third position is that at least in some cases emotional reactions cause moral
judgments. Haidt's experimental manipulations of moral emotions and the
demonstration of the subsequent effects this has on moral judgment support this
position. And indeed, this evidence has made it difficult to argue with the idea that
emotions play at least some causal role in moral judgment.
However, there are major debates concerning the extent of emotional involvement
in moral judgment, and there is still great scope for disagreement. Some theorists
have argued for the dual role of cognitive and emotional processes in moral
judgment (e.g., Greene et al. 2001, 2004; Moore et al. 2008; Bucciarelli et al. 2008;
see also Cushman et al. 2006; Hauser et al. 2007), although there is no great
agreement between these authors about the nature of the cognitive processes
involved. Other theorists, however, including Jon Haidt and his collaborators, have
maintained that emotions are the critical driver of moral judgments. Although
allowing that cognitive override may sometimes affect moral jUdgments, these
authors have maintained a commitment to a social intuitionist model, according to
which: 'moral reasoning is an important part of moral life, but for most people, most
of the time, most of the action is in the quick, automatic, affective evaluations they
make of people and events' (Schnall et al. 2008, p. 1097).
This claim is very strong, and we take our findings concerning the perceived
objectivity of ethical beliefs to be relevant to it in the following two ways. First, our
data has shown that metajudgments of moral objectivity seem best predicted by
cognitive rather than affective factors. Second, it has also shown that objectivity
judgments are divergent from first order moral judgments, i.e., they are divergent
from strength of agreement ratings concerning moral beliefs. Both findings suggest
that there are important dimensions of moral judgment that are distinct from the
initial, affective reactions that playa role in producing first order moral judgments.
Our data also indicates that at least some of the predictors of objectivity
judgments-i.e.,
the extent to which a person grounds their ethical beliefs in God,
and the propensity for di~unctive thinking (i.e., the five blocks task)-are not
wholly affective. Taken at face value, these measures are predominantly cultural and
cognitive, respectively. Is it possible that they have more primitive, affective roots?
This seems possible for the religious grounding of ethics, but not for the measure of
di~unctive thinking. Perhaps some other, more affective measure, is a better
predictor of individual differences in objectivity judgments, and subsumes the two
measures we have found to be predictive. This, of course, cannot be ruled out
entirely. But it strikes us as an implausible pOSSibility, particularly since Need for
Closure, which measures more affective and motivational components than the
di~unctive thinking measure, had almost no predictive power in our experiments. Of
course, affective reactions may explain part of the variance in Objectivity
assessments,and as yet, we have not yet measured them directly. Nevertheless, the
current evidence suggests there are cognitive factors that underpin assessments of
Objectivity, and that these do not depend on affective responses.
Our research has also shown people's perceptions concerning the Objectivity of an
ethical belief diverge from how strongly they agree with that belief. This result is
hard to account for on the view that a single affective response underpins all aspects
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of moral judgment. Assuming that an underlying affective response causes a
person's agreement or disagreement with a particular ethical belief (the social
intuitionist claim), then if that affective response is the principal driver of all aspects
of moral judgment, it should also cause a convergent judgment about objectivity. We
did not observe this sort of convergence in judgment, however. Moreover, although
more evidence is needed, judgments of objectivity look like they have important
consequences. In our studies, they predicted discomfort with a disagreeing other
person over and above, and in fact more strongly than did strength of agreement
ratings. They also predicted the tendency to attribute a morally defective personality
to a disagreeing other person. And they predicted a self-reported reluctance to give
up an ethical belief. All three of these responses are likely to be important when
individuals are faced with real ethical disagreements.
Thus, it seems that there is an important property of moral judgment, namely
Objectivity, which is not predicted by affective reactions, and yet which has
important consequences. This claim may not be strictly contrary to Haidt's social
intuitionist model, because it could be that affect is the prime cause of first order
moral judgments, but not of second order, meta-ethical jUdgments-a state of affairs
that would be surprising for the social intuitionist account, but not inconsistent with
it. Nevertheless, we do wish to draw attention the multifaceted nature of moral
judgment, and to claim that this ought not to be ignored. Moral judgment depends
not just on the interplay between affect and cognition, but also on the interplay
between first order and second order moral jUdgments. Further attention needs to be
paid to each of these dimensions in order to better understand moral judgment in all
of its complexity.

8 Behavioral Implications
Research on moral objectivity arguably has several implications for public behavior
and policy. One implication is that judgments of objectivity may predict how
satisfied a person is with the prevailing legal code with regard to particular issues,
and a second implication is that judgments of Objectivity may affect the extent to
which moral values are prioritized in voting behavior. We deal with these two,
admittedly speculative, possibilities in turn.
The relationship between law and morality is a notoriously vexed issue of
jurisprudence. Our aim is not to comment directly on long-standing debates between
legal positivist and natural law interpretations of the law, but rather to position our
findings with respect to recent arguments that have highlighted the important relation
between moral intuitions and the law. One such argument has claimed that the law
influences behavior not just through its threat of sanction, but also through its power
to influence and shape social norms (Robinson and Darley 1997). According to this
argument, the law is capable of harnessing the powerful forces of social influence
and stigmatization in order to produce compliant behavior. This is particularly
important in cases where the morality (or immorality) of a particular behavior is not
obvious, and is not yet the subject of social norms. However, in order to gain this
power to shape norms and behavior, the law must itself possess general moral
credibility. It can gain such credibility by accurately reflecting the intuitions of
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justice that are held by the majority of the members of a society. If, on the other
hand, the law does not have sufficient moral credibility, it will have a reduced power
to influence social norms, and in some extreme cases pernicious consequences can
result, including vigilantism and flouting of the law.
The Rodney King race riots in Los Angeles were a vivid example of this idea.
Recent experimental evidence has also corroborated it. Nadler (2005) showed that
when participants were presented with a piece of legislation (Study 1) or a court
decision (Study 2) that they found to be unjust (by being too lenient), they reported a
greater intention to engage in minor law-breaking activity (Study 1), and to disregard
the instructions of ajudge when acting asjurors in a mock-trial setting (Study 2).
These results are intriguing, and suggest that if the law fails to properly reflect the
moral standards of society, negative consequences may result." It has yet to be
demonstrated that law-breaking behavior (as opposed to the intention to commit
such behavior) is made more likely as a result of perceiving the criminal justice
system to be unjust, which limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this
research. However, while this is an important question for future investigations to
pursue, other evidence does point to the strong predictive links between intentions
and behavior, particularly in caseswhere the behavior is under volitional control (see
e.g., PJzen and Fishbein 1975, 1977, 1980; Schifter and PJzen 1985).
Nadler's (2005) flouting effects were demonstrated in cases where participants
consider that a particular criminal liability is disproportionate to the transgression
that occasioned it. But the effect may occur not only when the proportionate severity
of transgression and punishment is in question, but also when the status of the
transgression itself-whether it is in fact a transgression-is in question. This is
particularly pertinent for a range of activities which are not obviously categorized as
wrong in themselves (or 'malum in se' in legal terminology). Such activities include
so-called 'victimless crimes' including prostitution, pornography, drug use, incest
between consenting adults, and 'public order violations' such as flag burning, or
desecrations of symbolic icons.
Whether a particular activity is considered wrong in itself as opposed to wrong
instrumentally is a separate conceptual issue from whether it is considered wrong
objectively, but there is likely to be considerable overlap in people'sjudgments. For
our purposes, the important question is whether an activity that the law criminalizes
and punishes is widely considered to be wrong in an objective sense, and conversely
whether an activity that the law fails to criminalize and does not puniSh, is widely
considered to be objectively permissible. Understanding how the public perceives
the objective-subjective dimension of particular moral issues is an important part of
understanding their moral intuitions about those issues-there is more to a moral
intuition than simply whether a person agrees with a jUdgment of wrongness or
permissibility. Our data has shown that perceptions of objectivity predict
psychological reactions independently of how strongly a person agrees with a claim
about permissibility or wrongness. Thus, we predict that if a person considers say,
incest, to be an objective moral wrong, they are likely to be disappointed with a legal
11 Consistent with this interpretation, some theorists have argued that the law has an 'expressive' function,
by which it signals the social values of a society, particularly in cases where existing norms about a
particular behavior are weak or undecided (e.g., Lessig 1996; Sunstein 1996).
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system that does not both criminalize it and impose considerable sanctions upon its
occurrence. And they should be more disappointed about this than a person who
considers incest to be wrong only in a sUbjective sense. Conversely, if a person
considers say, marUuana smoking to be wrong, but not in any objective sense, they
may be disappointed with a legal system that does criminalize and impose harsh
sanctions upon it, whereas a person would likely be more comfortable with this
result if they consider marUuana smoking to be objectively wrong.
These are speculative claims, because no directly relevant data exist to support
them directly. Nevertheless, there is good reason to suspect that researchers'
assessmentsof moral intuitions neglect an important dimension if they do not take
into account meta-ethical perceptions of objectivity and subjectivity. Such
perceptions may affect people's reactions to a criminal code's decisions about both
which acts to criminalize, and its decisions about sanctioning, which may in turn
affect their generalized respect for the law, and their intention to follow it.
Perceptions of objectivity may also impact voting behavior. Whether moral
beliefs and values are held to be objective facts is likely to influence how those
beliefs and values are prioritized in the polling booth. Although there is considerable
disagreement about the impact of moral values on voting behavior (see e.g., Fiorina
et al. 2004; Burden 2004; Hillygus and Shields 2005; Langer and Cohen 2005),
there is good evidence that they play at least some role in how people vote. John Jost
(2006) has shown that voting in US presidential elections spanning back to 1972 is
strongly predicted by political ideology-a psychological construct which includes
moral values to a considerable extent. Somewhat earlier, Sears et al. (1980)
demonstrated that long-term political and ideological commitments influence voting
behavior more than do immediate considerations of self-interest. Differences in
political ideology are obviously influenced by different factual beliefs about, for
instance, the most efficient use of government resources, and the likely effects of
redistribution of wealth-i.e., by beliefs about the best means to achieve certain
ends. But they are also influenced by disagreements over the correct ends to pursue,
and the relative importance of moral values such as fairness, equality, selfdetermination, self-responsibility, and the value of life.
Moral values can affect voting about value of life issues, such as abortion or gay
marriage. But their effects extend well beyond these familiar examples. They also
affect political opinions about economic, environmental, health-care, and foreign
pol icy issues, to namejust a few examples (see e.g., Rorty 1999). Perceptions about
the objectivity of these opinions, and the values underlying them, may playa role in
voting behavior in the following sense. Some values are considered to be 'sacred' or
protected' (see e.g., Baron and Spranca 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003), in
that they are thought to be so important that they should not be compromised.
Tetlock et al. (2000), demonstrated the existence of such 'taboo trade-offs'. They
showed that the mere contemplation of a trade-off between a sacred value such as
the right to vote, and money (i.e., a scenario in which votes were bought in an
election) elicits both moral outrage, and a desire for moral 'cleanSing'. Baron and
Spranca (1997) showed that values which people claim ought never be compromised, are associated with several other psychology properties, including quantity
insensitivity (people are insensitive to the amount of the compromise), agent
relativity (the agent's participation in breaching the value is what matters most, not
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the consequences of the breach), and moral obligatoriness (that is, they are treated as
holding independently of whether people think that is the case).
Voting, of course, inherently involves compromise and trade-off-no one political
candidate is likely to endorse the full range of values that you do. But a protected or
sacred value is one that is unlikely to be compromised when voting. However, it is
not entirely clear why some values are considered sacred or protected, and others are
not. One factor that might predict this is objectivity (Baron and Spranca 1997, make
a similar suggestion). Hence, we would predict that if a moral value is thought to be
Objective, it is more likely to be afforded a sacred or protected status-and thus, an
individual will be unwilling to compromise on that value when deciding how to
vote. Again, no data exist to support this contention, and so it is a task for future
research to examine it.

9 Oqjectivity

and Moralism

One final connection with public policy stems from an intriguing recent study which
investigated how broadly individuals construe the moral universe. Lovett and Jordan
(2005) investigated whether or not people view a range of everyday activities as
imbued with a moral quality-a
tendency they refer to as 'moralism'. They
demonstrated that people who voted for George Bush in the 2004 US Presidential
election were more likely to moralize than were people who voted for John Kerry.
That, is they were more likely to perceive activities such as sleeping in late,
overeating, and taking on a challenging college course, as involving a moral aspect.
One interpretation of this finding is that such voters were more inclined to see
personal or private virtue as fundamentally a moral issue.
A tendency to moralize is not the same as a tendency to view moral values as
objective. A person might see only a limited range of activities as involving a moral
component, but perceive such values to be highly objective. Thus, an interesting
psychological question arises as to whether individuals who tend to be Objective
about moral values are also more likely to see a larger range of activities as
involving a moral component-i.e., to 'moralize'. We suspect that this is the case,
although again, this is a question for future research.

10 Conclusion
The psychological investigation of ethical objectivity is in its infancy, but important
findings have been made. We have argued that there are systematic sources of
variance with respect to ethical objectivity. Some individuals treat their ethical
beliefs as more objective than do others, and this appears to be predicted partly by
the religious grounding of ethics, and partly by a disposition towards di~unctive
thinking. Other factors may yet be discovered which yield further insight into this
individual difference. Moreover, some ethical beliefs are treated as more objective
than others and this appears to be predicted by the valence of the action under
consideration, and may also be predicted by social factors such as perceived
consensus. Holding an objective view predicts a more 'closed' response to ethical
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disagreement, which has implications for how real ethical disputes may be resolved.
Many questions still remain to be answered, and we have described several which
we think are worth pursuing next.
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